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ABSTRACT 
In this study, we model the demand for and supply of charging facility at workplace, and the associated 
consequences on social welfare. We found that both employers and workers benefit from the accessibility of 
workplace charging when: i) they agree to pay for workplace charging out of gross salary and when the labor 
tax is high; ii) employers pay less electricity tariff than households do; iii) the employment contract duration is 
long; iv) recharging electric vehicles (EVs) takes longer time and the value of time is higher. Accessibility of 
cheaper charging facility at workplace, while saves the charging time and increases the share of EVs as 
commuting mode, it results in unintended consequences including electricity peak-load problem, an increase in 
electricity tariff for household use, and an increase in car use that worsens traffic congestion. For the electricity 
supplier, workplace charging increases the cost of supplying electricity by aggravating the daytime peak-load 
problem and by increasing the demand variation from the mean. Tax based on yearly travel distance, and 
restriction on free workplace charging access improves social welfare. The results from this study are relevant 
in (i) helping to predict the choice of time and place of charging of employees’ EVs, (ii) supporting employers 
to understand the implications of workplace charging provision,  (iii) providing electricity suppliers with 
information for better electricity demand predictions, and (iv) revealing to policy makers the non-taxed fringe 
benefit problem of charging at the workplace.  
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